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Abstract
In this paper we study game-theoretic foundations for norms. We assume that
a norm is a mechanism to obtain desired multi-agent system behavior, and must
therefore under normal or typical circumstances be fulfilled by a range of agent
types, such as norm internalizing agents, respectful agents fulfilling norms if pos-
sible, and selfish agents obeying norms only due to the associated sanctions.
1 Introduction
The relation between game theory and norms has received some attention. E.g., in a
widely discussed example of the so-called centipede game, there is a pile of thousand
pennies, and two agents can in turn either take one or two pennies. If an agent takes
one then the other agent takes turn, if it takes two then the game ends. A backward
induction argument implies that it is rational only to take two at the first turn. Norms
and trust have been discussed to analyze this behavior, see [6] for a discussion.
Our approach to study this relation it to use game-theory for the foundations of nor-
mative systems. In artificial social systems or normative multi-agent systems, a social
law or norm is a mechanism to achieve desired system behavior. Since in an open sys-
tem it cannot be assumed that agents obey the norm, there has to be a control system
motivating agents to obey the norm, by monitoring and sanctioning behaviors. More-
over, the system should not sanction without reason, as for example Caligula or Nero
did in the ancient Roman times, as the norms would loose their force to motivate agents.
Various ways to motivate agents including norms have been studied in economics, for
example using the game-theoretic machinery to study the rationality of norms.
The research question of this paper is how to give game-theoretic foundations to
norms such as obligations, permissions and counts-as conditionals. Most of our study
is focussed on obligations, and therefore on incentives like sanctions and rewards.
We first consider the so-called partially controlled multi-agent system (PCMAS)
approach of Brafman and Tennenholtz [3], one of the classical game-theoretical studies
of social laws in so-called artificial social systems developed by Tennenholtz and col-
leagues, because incentives like sanctions and rewards play a central role in this theory.
So-called controllable agents – agents controlled by the system programmer – enforce
social behavior by punishing and rewarding agents, and thus can be seen as representa-
tives of the normative system. For example, consider an iterative prisoner dilemma. A
controlled agent can be programmed such that it defects when it happens to encounter
an agent which has defected in a previous round.
The PCMAS model thus distinguishes between two kinds of agent interaction in
the game theory, namely between two normal (so-called uncontrollable) agents, and
between a normal and a controllable agent. We show in this paper that this makes it a
very useful model to give game-theoretic foundations to norms. Whereas classical game
theory is only concerned with interaction among normal agents, it is the interaction
among normal and controllable agents which we use in our game theoretic foundations.
The PCMAS approach not only clarifies the design of punishments, but it also il-
lustrates the iterative and multi-agent character of social laws. However, there are also
drawbacks of the model, such that it cannot be used to give a completely satisfactory
game-theoretic foundation for norms. We would like to express that a norm can be used
for various kinds of agents, such as norm internalizing agents, respectful agents that
attempt to evade norm violations, and selfish agents that obey norms only due to the as-
sociated sanctions. Therefore, as classical game theory is too abstract to satisfactorily
distinguish among agent types, we consider also cognitive agents and qualitative game
theory.
The layout of this paper is as follows. First we give some informal requirements,
and we discuss how the Brafman-Tennenholtz model of PCMAS satisfies these require-
ments. Then we introduce a qualitative game-theory based on a logic for mental atti-
tudes and cognitive agent theory, which we use to give game-theoretic foundations of
obligations and permissions.
2 Requirements
Before we start, we would like to recall the role of incentives in economics. Consider
the economist Levitt [8, p.18-20], discussing an example of Gneezy and Rustichini [5].
Imagine for a moment that you are the manager of a day-care center. You
have a clearly stated policy that children are supposed to be picked up
by 4 p.m. But very often parents are late. The result: at day’s end, you
have some anxious children and at least a teacher must wait around for the
parents to arrive. What to do?
A pair of economists who heard of this dilemma – it turned out to be a
rather common one – offered a solution: fine the tardy parents. Why, after
all, should the day-care center take care of these kids for free?
The economists decided to test their solution by conducting a study of
ten day-care centers in Haifa, Israel. The study lasted twenty weeks, but
the fine was not introduced immediately. For the first four weeks, the
economists simply kept track of the number of participants who came late;
there were, on average, eight pickups per week per day-center. In the fifth
week, the fine was enacted. It was announced that any parent arriving
more than ten minutes late would pay $3 per child for each incident. The
fee would be added to the parents’ monthly bill, which was roughly $380.
After the fine was enacted, the number of late pickups promptly went . . .
up. Before long there were twenty late pickups per week, more than double
the original average. The incentive had plainly backfired.
Economics is, at root, the study of incentives: how people get what they
want, or need, especially when other people want or need the same thing.
Economists love incentives. They love to dream them up and enact them,
study them and tinker with them. The typical economist believes the world
has not yet invented a problem that he cannot fix if given a free hand to
design the proper incentive scheme. His solution may not always be pretty–
but the original problem, rest assured, will be fixed. An incentive is a
bullet, a lever, a key: an often tiny object with astonishing power to change
a situation.
. . .
There are three basic flavors of incentive: economic, social, and moral.
Very often a single incentive scheme will include all three varieties. Think
about the anti-smoking campaign of recent years. The addition of $3-per-
pack “sin tax” is a strong economic incentive against buying cigarettes.
The banning of cigarettes in restaurants and bars is a powerful social in-
centive. And when the U.S. government asserts that terrorists raise money
by selling black-market cigarettes, that acts as a rather jarring moral incen-
tive.
The daycare example illustrates that an analysis should not naively restrict itself to
economic incentives. The example illustrates that economic theory considers normative
reasoning. Since classical decision and game theory are the main tools to study incen-
tives in economics, we suggest that they are useful tools to study the role of normative
incentives too. Though this is not uncommon in economics, most formal approaches to
normative reasoning are developed regardless of game theoretic considerations. In the
remainder of this section we list requirements for such an analysis.
The first requirement is that norms influence the behavior of agents. However,
they only have to do so under normal or typical circumstances. For example, if other
agents are not obeying the norm, then we cannot expect an agent to do so. This norm
acceptance has been studied by [4], and in a game-theoretic setting for social laws
by [14].
The second requirement is that even if a norm is accepted in the sense that the
other agents obey the norm, an agent should be able to violate the norms. A normative
multi-agent system is a “set of agents [...] whose interactions can be regarded as norm-
governed; the norms prescribe how the agents ideally should and should not behave.
[...] Importantly, the norms allow for the possibility that actual behavior may at times
deviate from the ideal, i.e., that violations of obligations, or of agents’ rights, may
occur” [7].
In other words, the norms of global policies must be represented as soft constraints,
which are used in detective control systems where violations can be detected, instead
of hard constraints restricted to preventative control systems in which violations are
impossible. The typical example of the former is that you can enter a train without a
ticket, but you may be checked and sanctioned, and an example of the latter is that you
cannot enter a metro station without a ticket.
Moreover, detective control is the result of actions of agents and therefore subject
to errors and influenceable by actions of other agents. Therefore, it may be the case that
violations are not often enough detected, that law enforcement is lazy or can be bribed,
there are conflicting obligations in the normative system, that agents are able to block
the sanction, block the prosecution, update the normative system, etc. A game-theoretic
analysis can be used to study these issues of fraud and deception.
As the daycare example illustrates, the third requirement is that norms should apply
to a variety of agent types. We assume that a norm is a mechanism to obtain desired
multi-agent system behavior, and must therefore under normal or typical circumstances
be fulfilled for a range of agent types, such as norm internalizing agents, respectful
agents that attempt to evade norm violations, and selfish agents that obey norms only
due to the associated sanctions. To distinguish these cases, we distinguish between the
decision to count behavior as a violation, and to sanction it.
Given possible conditions for a norm, the fourth requirement is that norms are as
weak as possible, in the sense that the norms should not apply in cases where this
is undesired, and that sanctions should not be too severe. The latter is motivated by
a classical economic argument due to Beccaria, which says that if sanctions are too
high, they can no longer be used in cases where agents already have violated a norm.
Sanctions should be high enough to motivate selfish agents, but they should not be too
high.
3 Requirements in PCMAS
Several game-theoretic studies on social laws have been made by Tennenholtz and col-
leagues, for example based on off-line design of social laws [12], the emergence of
conventions [13], and the stability of social laws [14]. The approach of Brafman and
Tennenholtz [3] distinguishes between controllable and uncontrollable agents, analo-
gous to the distinction between controllable and uncontrollable events in discrete event
systems.
3.1 PCMAS
Controllable agents are agents controlled by the system programmer to enforce social
behavior by punishing and rewarding agents. The game-theoretic model is the most
common model for representing emergent behavior in a population. A single game
consists of the usual payoff matrix. For example, the prisoner’s dilemma is a two person
game where each agent can either cooperate or defect.
Definition 1 A k-person game g is defined by a k-dimensional matrix M of size n1 ×
. . .× nk, where nm is the number of possible actions (or strategies) of the m’th agent.
The entries of M are vectors of length k of real numbers, called pay-off vectors. A joint
strategy in M is a tuple (i1, i2, . . . , ik), where for each i ≤ j ≤ k, it is the case that
1 ≤ ij ≤ nj .
An iterative game consists of a sequence of single games.
Definition 2 A n-k-g iterative game consists of a set of n agents and a given k person
game g. The game is played repetitively an unbounded number of times. At each
iteration, a random k-tuple of agents play an instance of the game, where the members
of this k-tuple are selected with uniform distribution from the set of agents.
Efficiency is a global criterion for judging the “goodness” of outcomes from the
system’s perspective, unlike single payoffs which describe a single agent’s perspective.
Definition 3 A joint strategy of a game g is called efficient if the sum of the players
pay-offs is maximal.
New in the Brafman-Tennenholtz model are the notions of punishment and reward
w.r.t. some joint strategy s, measuring the gain (benefit) or loss (punishment) of an
agent if we can somehow change the joint behavior of the agents from a chosen efficient
solution s to s′.
Definition 4 Let s be a fixed joint strategy for a given game g, with pay-off pi(s) for
player i; in an instance of g in which a joint strategy s′ was played, if pi(s) ≥ pi(s′) we
say that i’s punishment w.r.t. s is pi(s) − pi(s′), and otherwise we say that its benefit
w.r.t. s is pi(s′)− pi(s).
Agents may need to be constrained to behave in a way that is locally sub-optimal
such that the multi-agent system is as efficient as possible. Brafman and Tennenholtz
call such a constraint a social law. Then they informally define controlled agents:
“Agents not conforming to the social law are referred to as malicious agents.
In order to prevent the temptation to exploit the social law, we introduce
a number of punishing agents, designed by the initial designer, that will
play ‘irrationally’ if they detect behavior not conforming to the social law,
attempting to minimize the payoff of malicious agents. The knowledge
that future participants have of the punishment policy would deter devi-
ations and eliminate the need for carrying it out. Hence, the punishing
behavior is used as a threat aimed at deterring other agents from violating
the social law. This threat is (part of) the control strategy adopted by the
controllable agents in order to influence the behavior of the uncontrollable
agents. Notice that this control strategy relies on the structural assumption
that uncontrollable agents are expected utility maximizers.”
They consider the design of punishments, and show, for example, necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of a punishing strategy.
3.2 PCMAS as game-theoretic foundations for norms
We believe that PCMAS can be used to give game-theoretic foundations to norms,
though Brafman and Tennenholtz do not use or consider the terminology of normative
systems or deontic logic. The model fulfills our two requirements by explaining several
aspects of norms, such as the fact that they can be used iteratively, that sanctions are
associated to it, and that they can be applied to various kinds of agents.
In particular, a useful property of the PCMAS model is that it uses the game-
theoretic machinery to study not only interaction among normal agents, but also interac-
tion among the controlled agents and the normal agents. Since the controlled agents are
representatives of the normative system, this means that the game-theoretic machinery
is used to study the interaction among the normative system and the agents.
However, the emphasis on modeling uncontrollable agents as utility maximizers
implies that they only obey the norm because they are afraid of the sanction. Thus
the model does not fulfill the third requirement because it seems to exclude the pos-
sibility that an agent obeys the norm simply due to its existence. In social theory, for
example, agents have been studied which internalize norms in the sense that they incor-
porate norms as their own goal, or respectful agents trying to obey the norms without
internalizing them.
Maybe the game-theoretic machinery can be extended to take such social agents into
account. For example, a norm internalizing agent may be defined as an uncontrollable
agent which simply copies the utility function of a punishing agent, and a respectful
agent which avoids sanctions even when the number of punishing agents is too low,
for example by assuming the number of punishing agents is much higher than it is in
reality. They may for example be ashamed to be caught while driving without a train
ticket.
However, such a solution does not seem very satisfactory. For the norm internalizing
agents, they not only obey the norm but they also start to act as policemen, which seems
to go to far. Moreover, even when punishment is low or absent, a respectful agent may
obey the norm (as in the daycare example). There seem to be several alternative ways
to define respectful agents, but they seem to have their own drawbacks.
Moreover, there are also some more technical problems. For PCMAS to give game-
theoretic foundations to norms, we first have to define the syntax of a norm. Typically
norms are expressed as modal sentences expressing that p is obliged, O(p) in a deontic
logic, or p is permitted, P (p). Since in the PCMAS setting we have actions or strategies
only, we define Oi(α, p) for agent i is obliged to do action α, otherwise he is sanctioned
with punishment p. Since a punishment p is defined as pi(s)− pi(s′), the first problem
is how to define the chosen efficient solution s′. It is implicit in the condition that in the
situation in which no norm is violated, no agent is punished (the Nero/Caligula example
of the introduction).
Finally, whether an obligation Oi(α, p) holds in PCMAS or not cannot be seen
from the game’s definition, but only from the behavior of the controlled agents. In
other words, it can only be derived from the design of punishments not explicit in the
game theory.
3.3 Qualitative game-theoretic foundations
Since agent types have been studied in qualitative game theories, it seems an obvious
step to replace the utility maximizers by an alternative agent model. In the remainder
of this paper we consider goal based cognitive agents, as they have been studied in
philosophical logic, artificial intelligence, social theory and multi-agent systems. Since
qualitative game theories are more closely related to logic than their quantitative prede-
cessors, this will also facilitate the bridge to deontic logic.
For norm internalizing and respectful agents, we can use a qualitative game theory
as follows:
• By replacing the agents utility function by goals, norm internalizing agents can
adopt (some of) the goals of the normative system. Note that this does not imply
that the norm internalizing agents behave like the uncontrollable agents, because
they may have other goals in addition, or other abilities or powers.
• Even when agents do not adopt the goals of the normative system, they can still
take them into account. Moreover, by introducing a violation predicate in the log-
ical language, we can distinguish between behavior which counts as a violation,
and behavior which is sanctioned.
Qualitative game theories also have other advantages, though we do not study them
in this paper. For example, they can be based on a more sophisticated notion of action,
for example regarding causality or the observability of actions. Finally, a qualitative
approach can be used to give a more detailed analysis of norms. It is less clear how
PCMAS can be used to decompose the notion of norm or social law into separate com-
ponents, as we will see in the following section.
4 Qualitative games among cognitive agents
In Boella and Lesmo’s game-theoretic approach to norms [2], a rational definition of
sanction-based obligations is given using classical game theory by representing the nor-
mative system as an agent. They model the normative system as a set of controlled
agents, as in the PCMAS model, but they do not necessarily assume that they are con-
trolled by the system programmer. We use a model of cognitive agents that is able
to distinguish among norm internalizing agents, respectful agents that attempt to evade
norm violations, and selfish agents that obey norms only due to the associated sanctions.
We have to be brief on technical details, and refer the reader to other work for the
details. The important issue here is to give the flavor of cognitive agent theory, where
the maximization of expected utility is replaced by maximization of achieved goals.
4.1 Input/output logic for mental attitudes
Makinson and van der Torre [9] define the proof theory of input/output logic as follows.
Definition 5 Let L be a propositional language, let the norms in G be pairs of L
{(α1, β1), . . . , (αn, βn)}, read as ‘if input α1, then output β1’, etc., and consider the
following proof rules strengthening of the input (SI), conjunction for the output (AND),
weakening of the output (WO), disjunction of the input (OR), and cumulative transitiv-
ity (CT) and Identity (Id) defined as follows:
(α, γ)
(α ∧ β, γ)SI
(α, β), (α, γ)
(α, β ∧ γ) AND
(α, β ∧ γ)
(α, β)
WO
(α, γ), (β, γ)
(α ∨ β, γ) OR
(α, β), (α ∧ β, γ)
(α, γ)
CT
(α, α)
Id
The following four output operators are defined as closure operators on the set G using
the rules above.
out1: SI+AND+WO (simple-minded output)
out2: SI+AND+WO+OR (basic output)
out3: SI+AND+WO+CT (reusable output)
out4: SI+AND+WO+OR+CT (basic reusable output)
Moreover, the following four throughput operators are defined as closure operators on
the set G.
out+i : out i+Id (throughput)
We write out(G) for any of these output operations, and out+(G) for any of these
throughput operations.
Semantics of input/output logics have been given for out(G) in a classical Tarskian
style (a model is a pair of sets of propositional valuations, with additional constraints)
and for out(G,A) = {x | a ⊆ A, (a, x) ∈ out(G)} in a more operational style. More-
over, extensions of input/output logics have been developed for contrary-to-duty rea-
soning [10] and for reasoning about weak and various kinds of strong permission [11].
The following definition extends constraints with a priority relation among norms,
to resolve conflicts. Moreover, it introduces undercutter rules a → b, which mean that
if input a, then the output does not contain x. They are used to model permissions as
exceptions to obligations.
Definition 6 Let L be a propositional language, let G and H be two sets of pairs of
L, let ≥: 2G∪H × 2G∪H be a transitive and reflexive relation on subsets of these pairs,
and let out be an output operation.
• A pair 〈G′, H ′〉 is consistent in a if out(G′, a) is consistent, and for each (b, x) ∈
H ′, if b ∈ out(G′, a) then x 6∈ out(G′, a).
• maxfamily(G,H,≥, a) is the set of pairs 〈G′ ⊆ G,H ′ ⊆ H〉 that:
1. are consistent in a, and
2. if 〈G′′ ⊆ G,H ′′ ⊆ H〉 is consistent in a, G′ ⊆ G′′, and H ′ ⊆ H ′′, then
G′′ = G′ and H ′′ = H ′;
In other words, it is maximal with respect to set inclusion among the consistent
pairs;
• preffamily(G,H,≥, a) is the set of pairs 〈G′,H ′〉 that:
1. are in maxfamily(G,H,≥, a), and
2. if 〈G′′ ⊆ G,H ′′ ⊆ H〉 is in maxfamily(G,H,≥, a) and G′′ ∪ H ′′ ≥
G′ ∪H ′, then G′′ = G′ and H ′′ = H ′;
In other words, it is maximal with respect to ≥;
• out∩(G,H,≥, a) = ∩out(preffamily(G,H,≥, a),≥, a); In other words, using
only the rules which occur in all elements of preffamily .
4.2 Beliefs, goals, decisions, decision rule
To represent that agents are autonomous decision makers, we associate a set of deci-
sion variables with each agent. Decisions or actions are based on controllability from
control theory or discrete event systems (not to be confused with controllable agents!).
Moreover, each agent has four sets of rules, besides beliefs and goals also undercutters
for beliefs and goals. Finally, each agent has a priority relation among these rules.
Definition 7 Let L be a propositional logic based on the set of propositions X . A
multi-agent system is a tuple 〈A,B,G,C,H,AD,MD ≥〉 where:
• the agents A, beliefs, B, goals G, belief undercutters C, and goal undercutters
H are five disjoint sets;
• the agent description AD : A → 2B∪G∪C∪H∪X is a function from agents to its
beliefs, goals, undercutters, and decision variables;
• the mental description MD : B ∪ C ∪ G ∪H → L × L is a function from the
mental attitudes to input/output rules;
• the priority relation ≥: A → (2B∪C × 2B∪C) ∪ (2G∪H × 2G∪H) is a binary
relation on sets of beliefs and goals.
The qualitative decision rule is based on maximizing achieved goals, or minimizing
unachieved goals.
Definition 8 Given a multi-agent system, and let out+ be a throughput operation for
beliefs, and out an output operation for goals.
• A decision profile δ : (∪a∈AAD(a)∩X)→ {0, 1} is a function from the decision
variables to truth values; We represent δ by a logical formula;
• The expected effects of decision profile δ for agent a, E(δ, a), are out+∩ (AD(a)∩
B,AD(a) ∩ C,≥, δ);
• The unachieved goals according to agent a, U(δ, a), are ∩(G \ {G′|〈G′, H ′〉 ∈
preffamily(G,H,≥, E(δ, a))})
• δ is preferred to δ′ iff U(δ, a) ⊂ U(δ′, a)
4.3 Agent types
The qualitative game theory works analogous to the classical game theory, where the
maximization of expected utility is replaced by a minimization of unachieved goals.
This more detailed model allows us to distinguish among various agent types. In this
paper, we consider three agent types.
First, we consider norm internalizing agents. These uncontrollable agents incorpo-
rate some of the goals of the controllable agents. They thus behave like controllable
agents, if it is in their power.
Second, respectful agents try to fulfill obligations when they can do so. We model
this by making the violation conditions explicit in the controllable agents. They do not
sanction directly, but they first determine whether observed behavior is a violation, and
then associate a sanction with a violation. Respectful agents obey the norm, if they can,
regardless of the sanction.
Third, selfish agents care only about the sanctions imposed by the controllable
agents. They behave as traditional agents in economic theory.
5 Six clauses for obligation
For obligation and prohibition, we need at least six clauses. The first clause ensures
that “respectful” agents internalizing the goals of the normative system will fulfill their
obligation under typical circumstances, the second and third clause do so for “respect-
ful” agents not internalizing the norm, and the other clauses do so for “selfish” types
of agents. The first clause says that the obligation is in the desires and in the goals
of a normative system b (“your wish is my command”). The second and third clause
can be read as “the absence of x is considered as a violation”. The association of obli-
gations with violations is inspired by Anderson’s reduction of deontic logic to alethic
modal logic [1]. The third clause says that the normative system desires that there are
no violations. The fourth and fifth clause relate violations to sanctions and assume that
normative system b is motivated to apply sanctions only as long as there is a violation;
otherwise the norm would have no effect. Finally, for the same reason, we assume in
the last clause that the agent does not like the sanction.
Definition 9 (Obligation) Let MAS be a multi-agent system, and Ga = AD(a) ∩ G,
etc. Agent a ∈ A is obliged in MAS to decide to do xwith sanction s if Y by controllable
agent b, written as MAS |= Oa,b(x, s | Y ), if and only if:
1. Y → x ∈ out(Gb): if controllable agent b believes Y , then it desires and has as
a goal that x.
2. Y ∧ x → Va(¬x) ∈ out(Gb): if controllable b believes Y and ¬x, then it has
the goal Va(¬x): to recognize ¬x as a violation by agent a.
3. > → ¬Va(¬x) ∈ Gb: controllable agent b desires that there are no violations.
4. Y ∧ Va(¬x)} → s ∈ out(Gb: if controllable agent b believes Y and decides
Va(¬x), then it desires that it sanctions agent a with s.
5. Y ∧ ¬s ∈ out(Gb): if controllable agent b believes Y , then it desires not to
sanction, ¬s. The controllable agent only sanctions in case of violation.
6. Y → ¬s ∈ out(Ga): if agent a believes Y , then it desires ¬s, which expresses
that it does not like to be sanctioned.
6 Two clauses for permission
We do not define permissions as the absence of obligation, so-called negative permis-
sion, but as exceptions to obligations, a kind of positive permission. For a discussion
on the issues involved in modeling permission, see [11]. Permission is simpler than
obligation, since permissions cannot lead to violations and sanctions.
Here we distinguish between permission and entitlement or right. It is only due to
entitlement that knowledge providers may be sanctioned when they do not permit a user
to access documents, but the user itself cannot be a violator and be sanctioned due to
its permissions to access a document. which distinguishes between users that are only
permitted to access knowledge, and users that are also entitled to it in the sense that
knowledge providers are obliged to permit them access. Games can be played to show
that the clauses of permission are necessary, again for norm internalizing agents and
other types of agents respectively.
Definition 10 (Permission) Let MAS be a multi-agent system. Agent a ∈ A is permit-
ted to decide to do x if Y in MAS by controllable agent b, written as MAS |= Pa,b(x |
Y ), if and only if:
1. Y → x ∈ out(Hb): if controllable agent b believes Y , then it does not have a
goal that x.
2. Y ∪ {x} → ¬Va(x) ∈ out(Gb): if controllable agent b believes Y and x, then it
does not want to count x as a violation.
7 Summary
We show how the distinction between controllable and uncontrollable agents can be
used to give game-theoretic foundations for norms. First, we discuss how the PCMAS
model can be used to give such foundations for obligations. The main drawback of this
model is that it is not clear how to distinguish among agent types. Another drawback is
that it does not explain how to deal with other kinds of norms, such as permissions.
Second we discuss a straightforward extension of the PCMAS model using goal
based reasoners instead of utility maximizers. We show also how game-theoretic con-
siderations can be used to model permissions, based on a discussion by Bulygin. The
use of qualitative game theory makes a bridge to deontic logic, which formalized logical
relations among obligations and permissions.
A third kind of norms are constitutive norms known as counts-as conditionals,
which define institutional facts in a normative system, for example which pieces of
paper count as money, and which relations count as marriages. The game theoretic
foundations of this kind of norms is subject of further research.
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